FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
The price of anarchy in network creation games
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Bounded budget connection (BBC) games or how to make friends and influence people, on a budget
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A network creation game with nonuniform interests
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly) constant
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On approximate nash equilibria in network design
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On a bounded budget network creation game
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
A clustering coefficient network formation game
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On dynamics in basic network creation games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
SIROCCO'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Asymmetric swap-equilibrium: a unifying equilibrium concept for network creation games
MFCS'12 Proceedings of the 37th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Basic network creation games with communication interests
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Bounded-Distance network creation games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Greedy selfish network creation
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The max-distance network creation game on general host graphs
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Naturality of Network Creation Games, Measurement and Analysis
ASONAM '12 Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM 2012)
Brief announcement: a game-theoretic model motivated by the darpa network challenge
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On dynamics in selfish network creation
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the structure of equilibria in basic network formation
FCT'13 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
On Nash Equilibria for a Network Creation Game
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We study a natural network creation game, in which each node locally tries to minimize its local diameter or its local average distance to other nodes, by swapping one incident edge at a time. The central question is what structure the resulting equilibrium graphs have, in particular, how well they globally minimize diameter. For the local-average-distance version, we prove an upper bound of 2O(√ lg n), a lower bound of 3, a tight bound of exactly 2 for trees, and give evidence of a general polylogarithmic upper bound. For the local-diameter version, we prove a lower bound of Ω(√ n), and a tight upper bound of 3 for trees. All of our upper bounds apply equally well to previously extensively studied network creation games, both in terms of the diameter metric described above and the previously studied price of anarchy (which are related by constant factors). In surprising contrast, our model has no parameter α for the link creation cost, so our results automatically apply for all values of alpha without additional effort; furthermore, equilibrium can be checked in polynomial time in our model, unlike previous models. Our perspective enables simpler and more general proofs that get at the heart of network creation games.