Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Selfish traffic allocation for server farms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Extremal Graph Theory
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Bounded budget connection (BBC) games or how to make friends and influence people, on a budget
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Brief announcement: the price of anarchy for distributed network formation in an adversary model
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On approximate nash equilibria in network design
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The price of anarchy in cooperative network creation games
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
On a bounded budget network creation game
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Basic network creation games with communication interests
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
On Nash Equilibria for a Network Creation Game
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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In a network creation game, initially proposed by Fabrikant et al. [11], selfish players build a network by buying links to each other. Each player pays a fixed price per link a 0, and suffers an additional cost that is the sum of distances to all other players. We study an extension of this game where each player is only interested in its distances to a certain subset of players, called its friends. We study the social optima and Nash equilibria of our game, and prove upper and lower bounds for the "Price of Anarchy", the ratio between the social cost of the worst Nash equilibria and the optimal social cost. Our upper bound on the Price of Anarchy is O(1 + min (α, d, log n + √nα/d, √nd/α)) = O(√n), where n is the number of players, α is the edge building price, and d is the average number of friends per player. We derive a lower bound of Ω(log n/ log log n) on the Price of Anarchy.