Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On the topologies formed by selfish peers
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The price of anarchy in network creation games
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A network creation game with nonuniform interests
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
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We present a model for distributed network formation with cost expressing robustness in an adversary model. There are n players, each representing a vertex. Players may establish links to other players, building a link incurs a cost α. Individual cost comprises this building cost plus an indirect cost. After the network is built, an adversary deletes one link. The adversary is modeled by a random experiment, specified by a probability distribution on the links. Players know this distribution. Indirect cost for player v is the expected number of players to which v will become disconnected when the adversary strikes. We can prove an O(1) bound on the price of anarchy for two different adversaries under unilateral link formation. Under bilateral link formation, we can prove an O(1+√n/α) bound for one adversary, and for the other an asymptotically tight Ω(n) bound if α = Θ(1).