Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
The price of anarchy in network creation games
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
A network creation game with nonuniform interests
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly) constant
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On dynamics in basic network creation games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Greedy selfish network creation
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On dynamics in selfish network creation
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
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Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by a set of selfish peers. Each peer has the ability to change the network in a limited way, e.g., by creating or deleting incident links. In doing so, a peer can reduce its individual communication cost. Typically, these costs are modeled by the maximum or average distance in the network. We introduce a generalized version of the basic network creation game (BNCG). In the BNCG (by Alon et al., SPAA 2010), each peer may replace one of its incident links by a link to an arbitrary peer. This is done in a selfish way in order to minimize either the maximum or average distance to all other peers. That is, each peer works towards a network structure that allows himself to communicate efficiently with all other peers. However, participants of large networks are seldom interested in all peers. Rather, they want to communicate efficiently with a small subset only. Our model incorporates these (communication) interests explicitly. Given peers with interests and a communication network forming a tree, we prove several results on the structure and quality of equilibria in our model. We focus on the MAX-version, i.e., each node tries to minimize the maximum distance to nodes it is interested in, and give an upper bound of ${\mathcal O}({\sqrt{n})}$ for the private costs in an equilibrium of n peers. Moreover, we give an equilibrium for a circular interest graph where a node has private cost $\Omega({\sqrt{n})}$, showing that our bound is tight. This example can be extended such that we get a tight bound of $\Theta({\sqrt{n})}$ for the price of anarchy. For the case of general networks we show the price of anarchy to be Θ(n). Additionally, we prove an interesting connection between a maximum independent set in the interest graph and the private costs of the peers.