Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On the topologies formed by selfish peers
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Network Creation Games with Disconnected Equilibria
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly) constant
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The price of anarchy in cooperative network creation games
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
On a bounded budget network creation game
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On dynamics in basic network creation games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The price of anarchy in network creation games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Asymmetric swap-equilibrium: a unifying equilibrium concept for network creation games
MFCS'12 Proceedings of the 37th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
A classification of weakly acyclic games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Basic network creation games with communication interests
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Greedy selfish network creation
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The max-distance network creation game on general host graphs
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We consider the dynamic behavior of several variants of the Network Creation Game, introduced by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03]. Equilibrium networks in these models have desirable properties like low social cost and small diameter, which makes them attractive for the decentralized creation of overlay-networks. Unfortunately, due to the non-constructiveness of the Nash equilibrium, no distributed algorithm for finding such networks is known. We treat these games as sequential-move games and analyze if (uncoordinated) selfish play eventually converges to an equilibrium. Thus, we shed light on one of the most natural algorithms for this problem: distributed local search, where in each step some agent performs a myopic selfish improving move. We show that fast convergence is guaranteed for all versions of Swap Games, introduced by Alon et al. [SPAA'10], if the initial network is a tree. Furthermore, we prove that this process can be sped up to an almost optimal number of moves by employing a very natural move policy. Unfortunately, these positive results are no longer true if the initial network has cycles and we show the surprising result that even one non-tree edge suffices to destroy the convergence guarantee. This answers an open problem from Ehsani et al. [SPAA'11] in the negative. Moreover, we show that on non-tree networks no move policy can enforce convergence. We extend our negative results to the well-studied original version, where agents are allowed to buy and delete edges as well. For this model we prove that there is no convergence guarantee - even if all agents play optimally. Even worse, if played on a non-complete host-graph, then there are instances where no sequence of improving moves leads to a stable network. Furthermore, we analyze whether cost-sharing has positive impact on the convergence behavior. For this we consider a version by Corbo and Parkes [PODC'05] where bilateral consent is needed for the creation of an edge and where edge-costs are shared among the involved agents. We show that employing such a cost-sharing rule yields even worse dynamic behavior..