Navigating in hyperspace: designing a structure-based toolbox
Communications of the ACM
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
DIALM-POMC '03 Proceedings of the 2003 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Network Analysis: Methodological Foundations (Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
Network Analysis: Methodological Foundations (Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On the topologies formed by selfish peers
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The price of anarchy in network creation games
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Who should pay for forwarding packets?
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On dynamics in selfish network creation
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
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In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative networkcreation game (NCG) [11] to allow for disconnected equilibriumnetworks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and astrategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For each edge aplayer must pay a cost ±, and the individual cost for aplayer represents a trade-off between edge costs and shortest pathlengths to all other players. We extend the model to a penalizedgame (PCG), for which we reduce the penalty for a pair ofdisconnected players to a finite value ². We prove that thePCG is not a potential game, but pure Nash equilibria always exist,and pure strong equilibria exist in many cases. We provide tightconditions under which disconnected (strong) Nash equilibria canevolve. Components of these equilibria must be (strong) Nashequilibria of a smaller NCG. But in contrast to the NCG, for thevast majority of parameter values no tree is a stable component.Finally, we show that the price of anarchy is ˜(n), severalorders of magnitude larger than in the NCG. Perhaps surprisingly,the price of anarchy for strong equilibria increases only to atmost 4.