Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
The price of anarchy in network creation games
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly) constant
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On a bounded budget network creation game
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On dynamics in basic network creation games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Greedy selfish network creation
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The max-distance network creation game on general host graphs
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On dynamics in selfish network creation
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the structure of equilibria in basic network formation
FCT'13 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
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We introduce and study the concept of an asymmetric swap-equilibrium for network creation games. A graph where every edge is owned by one of its endpoints is called to be in asymmetric swap-equilibrium, if no vertex v can delete its own edge {v,w} and add a new edge {v,w′} and thereby decrease the sum of distances from v to all other vertices. This equilibrium concept generalizes and unifies some of the previous equilibrium concepts for network creation games. While the structure and the quality of equilibrium networks is still not fully understood, we provide further (partial) insights for this open problem. As the two main results, we show that (1) every asymmetric swap-equilibrium has at most one (non-trivial) 2-edge-connected component, and (2) we show a logarithmic upper bound on the diameter of an asymmetric swap-equilibrium for the case that the minimum degree of the unique 2-edge-connected component is at least nε, for $\varepsilon\frac{4\lg 3}{\lg n}$. Due to the generalizing property of asymmetric swap equilibria, these results hold for several equilibrium concepts that were previously studied. Along the way, we introduce a node-weighted version of the network creation games, which is of independent interest for further studies of network creation games.