Survey: Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems

  • Authors:
  • Shlomi Dolev;Elad M. Schiller;Paul G. Spirakis;Philippas Tsigas

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 84105, Israel;Department of Computing Science, Chalmers University of Technology and Göteborg University, Rännvägen 6B Göteborg, S-412 96, Sweden;Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, N. Kazantzakis str., University Campus, 265 00 Rio, Patras, Greece;Department of Computing Science, Chalmers University of Technology and Göteborg University, Rännvägen 6B Göteborg, S-412 96, Sweden

  • Venue:
  • Computer Science Review
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to non-cooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice.