A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
An update on quantum cryptography
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Limits on the provable consequences of one-way permutations (invited talk)
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
The Search for the Holy Grail in Quantum Cryptography
Lectures on Data Security, Modern Cryptology in Theory and Practice, Summer School, Aarhus, Denmark, July 1998
Energy-efficient link-layer jamming attacks against wireless sensor network MAC protocols
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Foundations of cryptography: a primer
Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science
Composable Security in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
Energy-efficient link-layer jamming attacks against wireless sensor network MAC protocols
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
Probabilistic event resolution with the pairwise random protocol
Proceedings of the 18th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
Bounds on the efficiency of black-box commitment schemes
Theoretical Computer Science
Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Protocols for multiparty coin toss with dishonest majority
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Tight bounds for classical and quantum coin flipping
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Constant-round non-malleable commitments from any one-way function
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Towards public key encryption scheme supporting equality test with fine-grained authorization
ACISP'11 Proceedings of the 16th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Cryptography in constant parallel time
Cryptography in constant parallel time
Cheat-proof peer-to-peer trading card games
Proceedings of the 10th Annual Workshop on Network and Systems Support for Games
Information-Theoretic conditions for two-party secure function evaluation
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
On the efficiency of bit commitment reductions
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Survey: Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
Computer Science Review
Public key encryption schemes supporting equality test with authorisation of different granularity
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
Byzantine renaming in synchronous systems with t
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Ensuring high-quality randomness in cryptographic key generation
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Alice and Bob want to flip a coin by telephone. (They have just divorced, live in different cities, want to decide who gets the car.) Bob would not like to tell Alice HEADS and hear Alice (at the other end of the line) say "Here goes . . . I'm flipping the coin. . . . You lost!"Coin-flipping in the SPECIAL way done here has a serious purpose. Indeed, it should prove an INDISPENSABLE TOOL of the protocol designer. Whenever a protocol requires one of two adversaries, say Alice, to pick a sequence of bits at random, and whenever it serves Alice's interests best NOT to pick her sequence of bits at random, then coin-flipping (Bob flipping coins to Alice) as defined here achieves the desired goal:1. It GUARANTEES to Bob that Alice will pick her sequence of bits at random. Her bit is 1 if Bob flips heads to her, O otherwise.2. It GUARANTEES to Alice that Bob will not know WHAT sequence of bits he flipped to her.Coin-flipping has already proved useful in solving a number of problems once thought impossible: mental poker, certified mail, and exchange of secrets. It will certainly prove a useful tool in solving other problems as well.