Fully Polynomial Byzantine Agreement for Processors in Rounds
SIAM Journal on Computing
Self-stabilization
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Self-stabilizing systems in spite of distributed control
Communications of the ACM
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Coin flipping by telephone a protocol for solving impossible problems
ACM SIGACT News - A special issue on cryptography
Self-stabilizing clock synchronization in the presence of Byzantine faults
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Game authority for robust andscalable distributed selfish-computer systems
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Lower bounds on implementing robust and resilient mediators
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Computer Science Review
Survey: Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
Computer Science Review
Hi-index | 5.23 |
Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to non-cooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice.