Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Comparing and aggregating rankings with ties
PODS '04 Proceedings of the twenty-third ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Multi-agent planning as a dynamic search for social consensus
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Vote manipulation in the presence of multiple sincere ballots
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Improved bounds for computing Kemeny rankings
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems
Theoretical Computer Science
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Preference elicitation techniques for group recommender systems
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Strategyproof approximations of distance rationalizable voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Manipulation under voting rule uncertainty
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Manipulating two stage voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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This paper addresses the problem of constructing voting protocols that are hard to manipulate. We describe a general technique for obtaining a new protocol by combining two or more base protocols, and study the resulting class of (vote-once) hybrid voting protocols, which also includes most previously known manipulation-resistant protocols. We show that for many choices of underlying base protocols, including some that are easily manipulable, their hybrids are NP-hard to manipulate, and demonstrate that this method can be used to produce manipulation-resistant protocols with unique combinations of useful features.