Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Voting policies that cope with unreliable agents
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Formalization of a voting protocol for virtual organizations
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Unconditional privacy in social choice
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Voting in online deliberative assemblies
ICAIL '05 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Improved bounds for computing Kemeny rankings
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Winner determination in sequential majority voting
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multi-agent coordination using local search
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Effects of Noise and Manipulation on the Accuracy of Collective Decision Rules
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Interleaving multi-agent systems and social networks for organized adaptation
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Some representation and computational issues in social choice
ECSQARU'05 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Voting in cooperative information agent scenarios: use and abuse
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Strategyproof approximations of distance rationalizable voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Manipulating two stage voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. A number of recent papers study the complexity of manipulating existing protocols. This paper is the first work to take the next step of designing new protocols that are especially hard to manipulate. Rather than designing these new protocols from scratch, we instead show how to tweak existing protocols to make manipulation hard, while leaving much of the original nature of the protocol intact. The tweak studied consists of adding one elimination preround to the election. Surprisingly, this extremely simple and universal tweak makes typical protocols hard to manipulate! The protocols become NP-hard, NP-hard, or PSPACE-hard to manipulate, depending on whether the schedule of the preround is determined before the votes are collected, after the votes are collected, or the scheduling and the vote collecting are interleaved, respectively. We prove general sufficient conditions on the protocols for this tweak to introduce the hardness, and show that the most common voting protocols satisfy those conditions. These are the first results in voting settings where manipulation is in a higher complexity class than NP (presuming PSPACE ≠ NP).