STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Secret sharing homomorphisms: keeping shares of a secret secret
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Elections with unconditionally-secret ballots and disruption equivalent to breaking RSA
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A zero-one law for Boolean privacy
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
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The aggregation of conflicting preferences is an important issue in human society and multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting among a set of alternatives has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. We consider the most general case of voting in which the voters' rankings of alternatives are mapped to a collective ranking of alternatives by a so-called social welfare functional (SWF). Maintaining privacy of individuals' preferences is crucial in order to guarantee freedom of choice (e.g., lack of vote coercing and reputation effects), and to not facilitate strategic voting. We investigate whether unconditional full privacy can be achieved in preference aggregation, that is, privacy that relies neither on trusted third parties (or on a certain fraction of the voters being trusted), nor on computational intractability assumptions. More precisely, we study the existence of distributed protocols that allow voters to jointly determine the collective preference ranking without revealing further information. We prove that there exists no SWF that is non-dictatorial, Paretian, monotonic, and privately computable (any three of these properties can be achieved). Moreover, we show that replacing privacy with anonymity enables the joint computation of arbitrary symmetric SWFs.