STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Secret sharing homomorphisms: keeping shares of a secret secret
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Elections with unconditionally-secret ballots and disruption equivalent to breaking RSA
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A zero-one law for Boolean privacy
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
Artificial Intelligence
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Self-tallying Elections and Perfect Ballot Secrecy
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Unconditional privacy in social choice
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Unconditional privacy in social choice
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A Fair Peer Selection Algorithm for an Ecommerce-Oriented Distributed Recommender System
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Advances in Intelligent IT: Active Media Technology 2006
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a key issue in multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. Voting among a set of alternatives can be used for such diverse tasks as choosing a joint plan in a multiagent system, determining a leader in a group of humans or agents, or voting among different resource or task allocations. Maintaining privacy of individuals' votes is crucial in order to guarantee freedom of choice (e.g., lack of vote coercing and reputation effects), and not facilitate strategic voting. We investigate whether unconditional full privacy can be achieved in voting, that is, privacy that relies neither on trusted third parties (or on a certain fraction of the voters being trusted), nor on computational intractability assumptions (such as the hardness of factoring). In particular, we study the existence of distributed protocols that allow voters to jointly determine the outcome of an election without revealing any information but the election outcome. We show the impossibility of reaching unconditional full privacy for a variety of the most common voting schemes ranging from simple veto voting to the single transferable vote scheme. On the positive side, we propose several distributed protocols that privately compute the outcome of common voting schemes while only revealing a limited amount of information.