Communication complexity
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
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AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
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Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
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Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
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Compilation and communication protocols for voting rules with a dynamic set of candidates
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Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
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Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols
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Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We determine the communication complexity of the common voting rules. The rules (sorted by their communication complexity from low to high) are plurality, plurality with runoff, single transferable vote (STV), Condorcet, approval, Bucklin, cup, maximin, Borda, Copeland, and ranked pairs. For each rule, we first give a deterministic communication protocol and an upper bound on the number of bits communicated in it; then, we give a lower bound on (even the nondeterministic) communication requirements of the voting rule. The bounds match for all voting rules except STV and maximin.