On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Communication complexity
Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
Some complexity questions related to distributive computing(Preliminary Report)
STOC '79 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Approximate strong equilibrium in job scheduling games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Searching for agent coalition using particle swarm optimization and death penalty function
ICIC'07 Proceedings of the intelligent computing 3rd international conference on Advanced intelligent computing theories and applications
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It is self-evident that in numerous Multiagent settings, selfish agents stand to benefit from cooperating by forming coalitions. Nevertheless, negotiating a stable distribution of the payoff among agents may prove challenging. The issue of coalition formation has been investigated extensively in the field of cooperative n-person game theory, but until recently little attention has been given to the complications that arise when the players are software agents. The bounded rationality of such agents has motivated researchers to study the computational complexity of the aforementioned problems.In this paper, we examine the communication complexity of coalition formation, in an environment whore each of the n agents knows only its own initial resources and utility function. Specifically, we give a tight Θ(n) bound on the communication complexity of the following solution concepts in unrestricted games: Shapley value, the nucleolus and the modified nucleolus, equal excess theory, and the core. Moreover, we show that in some intuitively appealing restricted games the communication complexity is constant, suggesting that it is possible to achieve sublinear complexity by constraining the environment or choosing a suitable solution concept.