Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
A Kernel-Oriented Model for Autonomous-Agent Coalition-Formation in General Environments
Proceedings of the First Australian Workshop on DAI: Distributed Artificial Intelligence: Architecture and Modelling
On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-attribute coalitional games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
The communication complexity of coalition formation among autonomous agents
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Reasoning about coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
Overlapping Coalition Formation
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On representing coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational aspects of mechanism design
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Sequentially optimal repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
JSAI'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence
GPC'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing
Coalitional games via network flows
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
An efficient vector-based representation for coalitional games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. In this paper we define a concise general representation for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show that it allows for efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that determining whether the core is nonempty is NP-complete both with and without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes the problem hard in both cases is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are given, the problem becomes tractable in both cases. However, we then demonstrate that for a hybrid version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible only within the grand coalition, the problem remains NP-complete even when the collaborative possibilities are given.