The complexity of Boolean functions
The complexity of Boolean functions
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On representing coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal Coalition Structure Generation In Partition Function Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
On the complexity of compact coalitional games
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Coalition structure generation in multi-agent systems with positive and negative externalities
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations
CP'09 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles and practice of constraint programming
Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Extension of MC-net-based coalition structure generation: handling negative rules and externalities
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Coalitional stability in structured environments
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Handling negative value rules in MC-net-based coalition structure generation
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Efficient computation of the shapley value for game-theoretic network centrality
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Weighted synergy graphs for effective team formation with heterogeneous ad hoc agents
Artificial Intelligence
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We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a coalition may be affected by the formation of other co-existing coalitions. Although externalities play a key role in many real-life situations, very little attention has been given to this issue in the multi-agent system literature, especially with regard to the computational aspects involved. To this end, we propose a new representation which, in the spirit of Ieong and Shoham [9], is based on Boolean expressions. The idea behind our representation is to construct much richer expressions that allow for capturing externalities induced upon coalitions. We show that the new representation is fully expressive, at least as concise as the conventional partition function game representation and, for many games, exponentially more concise. We evaluate the efficiency of our new representation by considering the problem of computing the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, a powerful extension of the conventional Shapley value to games with externalities. We show that by using our new representation, the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, which has not been studied in the computer science literature to date, can be computed in time linear in the size of the input.