Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
On the core of the multicommodity flow game
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Cooperative facility location games
Journal of Algorithms - Special issue: SODA 2000
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A kernel-oriented model for coalition-formation in general environments: implementation and results
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-attribute coalitional games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
The communication complexity of coalition formation among autonomous agents
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A randomized method for the shapley value for the voting game
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Computer science and game theory
Communications of the ACM - Designing games with a purpose
Game theoretic models for detecting network intrusions
Computer Communications
A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
Artificial Intelligence
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
An anytime approximation method for the inverse Shapley value problem
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A tractable and expressive class of marginal contribution nets and its applications
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Measuring Inconsistencies in Ontologies
ESWC '07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on The Semantic Web: Research and Applications
Reasoning about coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
On representing coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational aspects of mechanism design
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations
CP'09 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles and practice of constraint programming
A logic-based representation for coalitional games with externalities
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Non-transferable utility coalitional games via mixed-integer linear constraints
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
An architectural view of game theoretic control
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
The good, the bad and the cautious: safety level cooperative games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
An approach for multi-objective categorization based on the game theory and Markov process
Applied Soft Computing
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
Extension of MC-net-based coalition structure generation: handling negative rules and externalities
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
JSAI'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
Operations Research
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Efficient computation of the shapley value for game-theoretic network centrality
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
Tasks for agent-based negotiation teams: Analysis, review, and challenges
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Coalitional games via network flows
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
An efficient vector-based representation for coalitional games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalition formation to be successful, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts have been proposed, but the computational questions around these solution concepts have received little attention. We study a concise representation of characteristic functions which allows for the agents to be concerned with a number of independent issues that each coalition of agents can address. For example, there may be a set of tasks that the capacity-unconstrained agents could undertake, where accomplishing a task generates a certain amount of value (possibly depending on how well the task is accomplished). Given this representation, we show how to quickly compute the Shapley value--a seminal value division scheme that distributes the gains from cooperation fairly in a certain sense. We then show that in (distributed) marginal-contribution based value division schemes, which are known to be vulnerable to manipulation of the order in which the agents are added to the coalition, this manipulation is NP-complete. Thus, computational complexity serves as a barrier to manipulating the joining order. Finally, we show that given a value division, determining whether some subcoalition has an incentive to break away (in which case we say the division is not in the core) is NP-complete. So, computational complexity serves to increase the stability of the coalition.