Introduction to algorithms
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Multi-agent planning as a dynamic search for social consensus
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents
AAAI'91 Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
On the computational power of iterative auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
On the complexity of manipulating elections
CATS '07 Proceedings of the thirteenth Australasian symposium on Theory of computing - Volume 65
On the robustness of preference aggregation in noisy environments
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computational aspects of mechanism design
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Winner determination in sequential majority voting
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: Complexity results
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Interleaving multi-agent systems and social networks for organized adaptation
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Some representation and computational issues in social choice
ECSQARU'05 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
On exploiting agent technology in the design of peer-to-peer applications
AP2PC'04 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Voting in cooperative information agent scenarios: use and abuse
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
The distortion of cardinal preferences in voting
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
How to change a group's collective decision?
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Theory of Computing Systems
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In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area, but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded. We derive hardness results for the more common setting where the number of candidates is small but the number of voters can be large. We show that with complete information about the others' votes, individual manipulation is easy, and coalitional manipulation is easy with unweighted voters. However, constructive coalitional manipulation with weighted voters is intractable for all of the voting protocols under study, except in the Cup protocol. Destructive manipulation tends to be easier, except in the Single Transferable Vote protocol. Randomizing over instantiations of the protocols (such as schedules of a Cup) can be used to make manipulation hard. Finally, we show that under weak assumptions, if weighted coalitional manipulation with complete information about the others' votes is hard in some voting protocol, then individual and unweighted manipulation is hard when there is uncertainty about the others' votes.