An automated meeting scheduling system that utilizes user preferences
AGENTS '97 Proceedings of the first international conference on Autonomous agents
Voting for movies: the anatomy of a recommender system
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
Lectures on Discrete Geometry
A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
Artificial Intelligence
Voting in cooperative information agent scenarios: use and abuse
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The theoretical guarantees provided by voting have distinguished it as a prominent method of preference aggregation among autonomous agents. However, unlike humans, agents usually assign each candidate an exact utility, whereas an election is resolved based solely on each voter's linear ordering of candidates. In essence, the agents' cardinal (utility-based) preferences are embedded into the space of ordinal preferences. This often gives rise to a distortion in the preferences, and hence in the social welfare of the outcome. In this paper, we formally define and analyze the concept of distortion. We fully characterize the distortion under different restrictions imposed on agents' cardinal preferences; both possibility and strong impossibility results are established. We also tackle some computational aspects of calculating the distortion. Ultimately, we argue that, whenever voting is applied in a multiagent system, distortion must be a pivotal consideration.