Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the computational power of iterative auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Vote manipulation in the presence of multiple sincere ballots
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computational aspects of mechanism design
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: Complexity results
Artificial Intelligence
Some representation and computational issues in social choice
ECSQARU'05 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
On exploiting agent technology in the design of peer-to-peer applications
AP2PC'04 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
Voting in cooperative information agent scenarios: use and abuse
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. The complexity of manipulating realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant was recently studied [4], but the emphasis was on the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant number of candidates. That work, in many cases, left open the question: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when comparing the relative manipulability of different voting protocols. In this paper we answer that question for the voting protocols of the earlier study: plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, regular cup, and randomized cup. We also answer that question for two voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of manipulation have been derived before: veto and plurality with runoff. It turns out that the voting protocols under study become hard to manipulate at 3 candidates, 4 candidates, 7 candidates, or never.