An automated meeting scheduling system that utilizes user preferences
AGENTS '97 Proceedings of the first international conference on Autonomous agents
Voting for movies: the anatomy of a recommender system
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Automated design of scoring rules by learning from examples
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Note: Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
Theoretical Computer Science
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Nonmanipulable selections from a tournament
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Information and Computation
Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computational social choice: the first four centuries
XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students - Computer Science in Service of Democracy
Bribery in path-disruption games
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
FCT'07 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Multiagent systems, and the search for appropriate foundations
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Manipulating two stage voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Theory of Computing Systems
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Recently, computational complexity has been suggested as a means of precluding strategic behavior. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manipulate, but used NP-hardness as the complexity measure. Such a worst-case analysis may be an insufficient guarantee of resistance to manipulation. Indeed, we demonstrate that NP-hard manipulations may be tractable in the average-case. For this purpose, we augment the existing theory of average-case complexity with some new concepts. In particular, we consider elections distributed with respect to junta distributions, which concentrate on hard instances. We use our techniques to prove that scoring protocols are susceptible to manipulation by coalitions, when the number of candidates is constant.