When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Computational properties of argument systems satisfying graph-theoretic constraints
Artificial Intelligence
Mechanism design for abstract argumentation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Strategyproof deterministic lotteries under broadcast communication
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Manipulating Tournaments in Cup and Round Robin Competitions
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Designing competitions between teams of individuals
Artificial Intelligence
Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
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A tournament is a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Tournaments arise in many contexts that are relevant to AI, most notably in voting (as a method to aggregate the preferences of agents). There are many works that deal with choice rules that select a desirable alternative from a tournament, but very few of them deal directly with incentive issues, despite the fact that game-theoretic considerations are crucial with respect to systems populated by selfish agents. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of choice rules by considering two types of manipulation. We say that a choice rule is monotonic if an alternative cannot get itself selected by losing on purpose, and pairwise nonmanipulable if a pair of alternatives cannot make one of them the winner by reversing the outcome of the match between them. Our main result is a combinatorial construction of a choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise nonmanipulable, and onto the set of alternatives, for any number of alternatives besides three.