Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Introduction To Automata Theory, Languages, And Computation
Introduction To Automata Theory, Languages, And Computation
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Efficient similarity search and classification via rank aggregation
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
The complexity of Kemeny elections
Theoretical Computer Science
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Multi-agent planning as a dynamic search for social consensus
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents
AAAI'91 Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
AAIM '08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
MFCS '08 Proceedings of the 33rd international symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
COCOA 2008 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
On the complexity of schedule control problems for knockout tournaments
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Nonmanipulable selections from a tournament
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Multimode control attacks on elections
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Control complexity in fallback voting
CATS '10 Proceedings of the Sixteenth Symposium on Computing: the Australasian Theory - Volume 109
Information and Computation
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and fallback voting: solving three open problems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational complexity of two variants of the possible winner problem
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
The Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond
Control complexity in bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting: an experimental approach
SEA'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Experimental Algorithms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
On swap-distance geometry of voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
On elections with robust winners
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Control in the presence of manipulators: cooperative and competitive cases
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Control complexity of schulze voting
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Theory of Computing Systems
Discrete Applied Mathematics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Hi-index | 0.02 |
Preference aggregation in a multiagent setting is a central issue in both human and computer contexts. In this paper, we study in terms of complexity the vulnerability of preference aggregation to destructive control. In particular, we study the ability of an election's chair to, through such mechanisms as voter/candidate addition/suppression/partition, ensure that a particular candidate (equivalently, alternative) does not win. And we study the extent to which election systems can make it impossible, or computationally costly (NP-complete), for the chair to execute such control. Among the systems we study-plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting-we find cases where systems immune or computationally resistant to a chair choosing the winner nonetheless are vulnerable to the chair blocking a victory. Beyond that, we see that among our studied systems no one system offers the best protection against destructive control. Rather, the choice of a preference aggregation system will depend closely on which types of control one wishes to be protected against. We also find concrete cases where the complexity of or susceptibility to control varies dramatically based on the choice among natural tie-handling rules.