A polynomial time algorithm for unidimensional unfolding representations
Journal of Algorithms
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Single-peaked consistency and its complexity
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents
AAAI'91 Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
Operations Research Letters
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Clone structures in voters' preferences
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Control complexity in bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting: an experimental approach
SEA'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Experimental Algorithms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Theory of Computing Systems
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
A behavioral perspective on social choice
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Much work has been devoted, during the past 20years, to using complexity to protect elections from manipulation and control. Many ''complexity shield'' results have been obtained-results showing that the attacker's task can be made NP-hard. Recently there has been much focus on whether such worst-case hardness protections can be bypassed by frequently correct heuristics or by approximations. This paper takes a very different approach: We argue that when electorates follow the canonical political science model of societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the first place. In particular, we show that for electorates having single-peaked preferences, many existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control evaporate.