Average case complete problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
On polynomial-time bounded truth-table reducibility of NP sets to sparse sets
SIAM Journal on Computing
Raising NP lower bounds to parallel NP lower bounds
ACM SIGACT News
Average-case computational complexity theory
Complexity theory retrospective II
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Parameterized Complexity Theory (Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
Parameterized Complexity Theory (Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
On the complexity of manipulating elections
CATS '07 Proceedings of the thirteenth Australasian symposium on Theory of computing - Volume 65
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections
SWAT '08 Proceedings of the 11th Scandinavian workshop on Algorithm Theory
Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
COCOA 2008 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
Information Processing Letters
Single-peaked consistency and its complexity
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Note: Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
Theoretical Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
From approximate to optimal solutions: a case study of number partitioning
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Control complexity in fallback voting
CATS '10 Proceedings of the Sixteenth Symposium on Computing: the Australasian Theory - Volume 109
On problem kernels for possible winner determination under the k-approval protocol
MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
The Geometry of Manipulation: A Quantitative Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Information and Computation
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and fallback voting: solving three open problems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Empirical evaluation of voting rules with strictly ordered preference data
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
The Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond
Control complexity in bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting: an experimental approach
SEA'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Experimental Algorithms
Parameterized Complexity
Election manipulation: the average case
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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In the context of voting, manipulation and control refer to attempts to influence the outcome of elections by either setting some of the votes strategically (i.e., by reporting untruthful preferences) or by altering the structure of elections via adding, deleting, or partitioning either candidates or voters. Since by the celebrated Gibbard---Satterthwaite theorem (and other results expanding its scope) all reasonable voting systems are manipulable in principle and since many voting systems are in principle susceptible to many control types modeling natural control scenarios, much work has been done to use computational complexity as a shield to protect elections against manipulation and control. However, most of this work has merely yielded NP-hardness results, showing that certain voting systems resist certain types of manipulation or control only in the worst case. Various approaches, including studies of the typical case (where votes are given according to some natural distribution), pose serious challenges to such worst-case complexity results and might allow successful manipulation or control attempts, despite the NP-hardness of the corresponding problems. We survey and discuss some recent results on these challenges to complexity results for manipulation and control, including typical-case analyses and experiments, fixed-parameter tractability, domain restrictions (single-peakedness), and approximability.