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Information Processing Letters
Parameterized Complexity Theory (Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
Parameterized Complexity Theory (Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
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Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
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AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
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How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Parameterized Complexity
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
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Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
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Voting systems are common tools in a variety of areas. This paper studies parameterized computational complexity of control of Plurality, Condorcet and Approval voting systems, respectively. The types of controls considered include adding or deleting candidates or voters, under constructive or destructive setting. We obtain the following results: (1) constructive control by adding candidates in Plurality voting is W[2]-hard with respect to the parameter ''number of added candidates'', (2) destructive control by adding candidates in Plurality voting is W[2]-hard with respect to the parameter ''number of added candidates'', (3) constructive control by adding voters in Condorcet voting is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter ''number of added voters'', (4) constructive control by deleting voters in Condorcet voting is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter ''number of deleted voters'', (5) constructive control by adding voters in Approval voting is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter ''number of added voters'', and (6) constructive control by deleting voters in Approval voting is W[2]-hard with respect to the parameter ''number of deleted voters''.