Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The complexity of Kemeny elections
Theoretical Computer Science
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
On distance rationalizability of some voting rules
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Multimode control attacks on elections
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
The Geometry of Manipulation: A Quantitative Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Information and Computation
Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
The Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond
The complexity of losing voters
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Strategic considerations in the design of committees
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Control in the presence of manipulators: cooperative and competitive cases
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick opened the study of control attacks on elections-- attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding/deleting candidates or voters. That work has led to many results on how algorithms can be used to find attacks on elections and how complexity-theoretic hardness results can be used as shields against attacks. However, all the work in this line has assumed that the attacker employs just a single type of attack. In this paper, we model and study the case in which the attacker launches a multipronged (i.e., multimode) attack. We do so to more realistically capture the richness of real-life settings. For example, an attacker might simultaneously try to suppress some voters, attract new voters into the election, and introduce a spoiler candidate. Our model provides a unified framework for such varied attacks. By constructing polynomialtime multiprong attack algorithms we prove that for various election systems even such concerted, flexible attacks can be perfectly planned in deterministic polynomial time.