Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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We study settings in which a central authority must appoint a number of committees, where each committee is tasked with making a specific decision via a given voting rule. Each voter has their own individual preferences, and the center desires the decisions to be made in a certain way. The overall problem is whether the center can design the committees so that if the committee members then vote according to their preferences, the decisions will be made according to the desires of the center. After motivating and formally defining this problem, we investigate cases where this problem can be solved in polynomial time, and highlight cases where the problem is intractable. We consider a range of possible voting rules. We conclude with some possible extensions to the model and future work.