How hard is it to control an election?

Authors:
John J. Bartholdi, III;Craig A. Tovey;Michael A. Trick
Affiliations:
School of Industrial and Systems Engineering Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, U.S.A.;School of Industrial and Systems Engineering and College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, U.S.A.;Graduate School of Industrial Administration Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, U.S.A.
Venue:
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Year:
1992

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Abstract

Some voting schemes that are in principle susceptible to control are nevertheless resistant in practice due to excessive computational costs; others are vulnerable. We illustrate this in detail for plurality voting and for Condorcet voting.