Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
COCOA 2008 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Note: Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
Theoretical Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
Control complexity in fallback voting
CATS '10 Proceedings of the Sixteenth Symposium on Computing: the Australasian Theory - Volume 109
Information and Computation
The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and fallback voting: solving three open problems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the participation or structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that performing that case of control is computationally hard. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest known number of control resistances among natural voting systems.