Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Aggregating inconsistent information: ranking and clustering
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A computational study of the Kemeny rule for preference aggregation
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multimode control attacks on elections
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Argumentation Mechanism Design for Preferred Semantics
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2010
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Information and Computation
Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Preferences in AI: An overview
Artificial Intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: Complexity results
Artificial Intelligence
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximately strategy-proof voting
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Strategyproof approximations of distance rationalizable voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
FCT'07 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Triadic consensus: a randomized algorithm for voting in a crowd
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Manipulating two stage voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategy proofness in randomized social choice
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Maximal recursive rule: a new social decision scheme
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Theory of Computing Systems
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hi-index | 0.02 |
Aggregating the preferences of self-interested agents is a key problem for multiagent systems, and one general method for doing so is to vote over the alternatives (candidates). Unfortunately, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that when there are three or more candidates, all reasonable voting rules are manipulable (in the sense that there exist situations in which a voter would benefit from reporting its preferences insincerely). To circumvent this impossibility result, recent research has investigated whether it is possible to make finding a beneficial manipulation computationally hard. This approach has had some limited success, exhibiting rules under which the problem of finding a beneficial manipulation is NP-hard, #P-hard, or even PSPACE-hard. Thus, under these rules, it is unlikely that a computationally efficient algorithm can be constructed that always finds a beneficial manipulation (when it exists). However, this still does not preclude the existence of an efficient algorithm that often finds a successful manipulation (when it exists). There have been attempts to design a rule under which finding a beneficial manipulation is usually hard, but they have failed. To explain this failure, in this paper, we show that it is in fact impossible to design such a rule, if the rule is also required to satisfy another property: a large fraction of the manipulable instances are both weakly monotone, and allow the manipulators to make either of exactly two candidates win. We argue why one should expect voting rules to have this property, and show experimentally that common voting rules clearly satisfy it. We also discuss approaches for potentially circumventing this impossibility result.