Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
mCP nets: representing and reasoning with preferences of multiple agents
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
The Geometry of Manipulation: A Quantitative Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure, and the voters' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets that follow a common order over issues. Our main result is a simple full characterization of strategy-proof voting rules satisfying non-imposition for a very natural restriction on preferences in multi-issue domains: we show that if the preference domain is lexicographic, then a voting rule satisfying non-imposition is strategy-proof if and only if it can be decomposed into multiple strategy-proof local rules, one for each issue and each setting of the issues preceding it.We also obtain the following variant of Gibbard-Satterthwaite: when there are at least two issues and each of the issues can take at least two values, then there is no non-dictatorial strategy-proof voting rule that satisfies nonimposition, even when the domain of voters' preferences is restricted to linear orders that are consistent with acyclic CP-nets following a common order over issues. This impossibility result follows from either one of two more general new impossibility results we obtained, which are not included in this paper due to the space constraint.