Permutations of separable preference orders
Discrete Applied Mathematics
The computational complexity of choice sets
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Making social choices from individuals' CP-nets
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
mCP nets: representing and reasoning with preferences of multiple agents
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
The computational complexity of dominance and consistency in CP-nets
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements
UAI'99 Proceedings of the Fifteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Voting in Combinatorial Domains: What Logic and AI Have to Say
JELIA '08 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
The computational complexity of dominance and consistency in CP-Nets
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A dichotomy theorem on the existence of efficient or neutral sequential voting correspondences
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
Agreeing on social outcomes using individual CP-nets
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Planning in multiagent systems
Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
An Efficient Procedure for Collective Decision-making with CP-nets
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Graphical representation of ordinal preferences: languages and applications
ICCS'10 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Conceptual structures: from information to intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Computational techniques for a simple theory of conditional preferences
Artificial Intelligence
Majority-rule-based preference aggregation on multi-attribute domains with CP-nets
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Hypercubewise preference aggregation in multi-issue domains
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
A distributed protocol for collective decision-making in combinatorial domains
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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In group decision making, often the agents need to decide on multiple attributes at the same time, so that there are exponentially many alternatives. In this case, it is unrealistic to ask agents to communicate a full ranking of all the alternatives. To address this, earlier work has proposed decomposing such voting processes by using local voting rules on the individual attributes. Unfortunately, the existing methods work only with rather severe domain restrictions, as they require the voters' preferences to extend acyclic CP-nets compatible with a common order on the attributes. We first show that this requirement is very restrictive, by proving that the number of linear orders extending an acyclic CP-net is exponentially smaller than the number of all linear orders. Then, we introduce a very general methodology that allows us to aggregate preferences when voters express CP-nets that can be cyclic. There does not need to be any common structure among the submitted CP-nets. Our methodology generalizes the earlier, more restrictive methodology. We study whether properties of the local rules transfer to the global rule, and vice versa. We also address how to compute the winning alternatives.