Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Voting in Combinatorial Domains: What Logic and AI Have to Say
JELIA '08 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A dichotomy theorem on the existence of efficient or neutral sequential voting correspondences
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
An Efficient Procedure for Collective Decision-making with CP-nets
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Majority-rule-based preference aggregation on multi-attribute domains with CP-nets
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A distributed protocol for collective decision-making in combinatorial domains
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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Sequential composition of voting rules, by making use of structural properties of the voters' preferences, provide computationally economical ways for making a common decision over a Cartesian product of finite local domains. A sequential composition is usually defined on a set of legal profiles following a fixed order. In this paper, we generalize this by order-independent sequential composition and strong decomposability, which are independent of the chosen order. We study to which extent some usual properties of voting rules transfer from the local rules to their order-independent sequential composition. Then, to capture the idea that a voting rule is neutral or decomposable on a slightly smaller domain, we define nearly neutral, nearly decomposable rules for both sequential composition and order-independent sequential composition, which leads us to defining and studying decomposable permutations. We prove that any sequential composition of neutral local rules and any order-independent sequential composition of neutral local rules satisfying a necessary condition are nearly neutral.