Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Voting in Combinatorial Domains: What Logic and AI Have to Say
JELIA '08 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A dichotomy theorem on the existence of efficient or neutral sequential voting correspondences
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Multiple election paradoxes arise when voting separately on each issue from a set of related issues results in an obviously undesirable outcome. Several authors have argued that a sufficient condition for avoiding multiple election paradoxes is the assumption that voters have separable preferences. We show that this extremely demanding restriction can be relaxed into the much more reasonable one: there exists a linear order x1 … xp on the set of issues such that for each voter, every issue xi is preferentially independent of xi+1, …, xp given x1, …, xi-1. This leads us to define a family of sequential voting rules, defined as the sequential composition of local voting rules. These rules relate to the setting of conditional preference networks (CP-nets) recently developed in the Artificial Intelligence literature. We study in detail how these sequential rules inherit, or do not inherit, the properties of their local components. We focus on the case of multiple referenda, corresponding to multiple elections with binary issues.