Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Winner determination in sequential majority voting
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements
UAI'99 Proceedings of the Fifteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Compiling the votes of a subelectorate
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Agreeing on social outcomes using individual CP-nets
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Planning in multiagent systems
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Taking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the Possible Winner Problem in Pure Scoring Rules
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
On problem kernels for possible winner determination under the k-approval protocol
MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Practical voting rules with partial information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Approximation algorithms for campaign management
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The nearest neighbor spearman footrule distance for bucket, interval, and partial orders
FAW-AAIM'11 Proceedings of the 5th joint international frontiers in algorithmics, and 7th international conference on Algorithmic aspects in information and management
Possible and necessary winners in voting trees: majority graphs vs. profiles
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
Information Processing Letters
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Comparing and aggregating partial orders with kendall tau distances
WALCOM'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Algorithms and computation
Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial orders
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
The nearest neighbor Spearman footrule distance for bucket, interval, and partial orders
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Multi-winner social choice with incomplete preferences
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a profile of partial orders and a candidate c, two important questions arise: first, is c guaranteed to win, and second, is it still possible for c to win? These are the necessary winner and possible winner problems, respectively. We consider the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and the votes are unweighted. We prove that for Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and ranked pairs, the possible winner problem is NP-complete; also, we give a sufficient condition on scoring rules for the possible winner problem to be NP-complete (Borda satisfies this condition). We also prove that for Copeland and ranked pairs, the necessary winner problem is coNP-complete. All the hardness results hold even when the number of undetermined pairs in each vote is no more than a constant. We also present polynomial-time algorithms for the necessary winner problem for scoring rules, maximin, and Bucklin.