Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Supervised Ordering — An Empirical Survey
ICDM '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Data Mining
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences
Journal of Logic and Computation
Eliciting bid taker non-price preferences in (combinatorial) auctions
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism design with partial revelation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Constraint-based optimization and utility elicitation using the minimax decision criterion
Artificial Intelligence
Assessing regret-based preference elicitation with the UTPREF recommendation system
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Practical voting rules with partial information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
TreeMatrix: A Hybrid Visualization of Compound Graphs
Computer Graphics Forum
Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Communication complexity of approximating voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Triadic consensus: a randomized algorithm for voting in a crowd
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Elicitation and approximately stable matching with partial preferences
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Multi-winner social choice with incomplete preferences
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Hi-index | 0.00 |
While voting schemes provide an effective means for aggregating preferences, methods for the effective elicitation of voter preferences have received little attention. We address this problem by first considering approximate winner determination when incomplete voter preferences are provided. Exploiting natural scoring metrics, we use max regret to measure the quality or robustness of proposed winners, and develop polynomial time algorithms for computing the alternative with minimax regret for several popular voting rules. We then show how minimax regret can be used to effectively drive incremental preference/vote elicitation and devise several heuristics for this process. Despite worst-case theoretical results showing that most voting protocols require nearly complete voter preferences to determine winners, we demonstrate the practical effectiveness of regret-based elicitation for determining both approximate and exact winners on several real-world data sets.