Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Combinatorial Auctions
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
The communication cost of selfishness: ex post implementation
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Implementation with a bounded action space
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Constraint-based optimization and utility elicitation using the minimax decision criterion
Artificial Intelligence
Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
Management Science
Regret-based incremental partial revelation mechanisms
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Mechanisms for information elicitation
Artificial Intelligence
Partial revelation automated mechanism design
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Assessing regret-based preference elicitation with the UTPREF recommendation system
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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Classic direct mechanisms require full utility revelation from agents, which can be very difficult in practical multi-attribute settings. In this work, we study partial revelation within the framework of one-shot mechanisms. Each agent's type space is partitioned into a finite set of partial types and agents (should) report the partial type within which their full type lies. A classic result implies that implementation in dominant strategies is impossible in this model. We first show that a relaxation to Bayes-Nash implementation does not circumvent the problem. We then propose a class of partial revelation mechanisms that achieve approximate dominant strategy implementation, and describe a computationally tractable algorithm for myopically optimizing the partitioning of each agent's type space to reduce manipulability and social welfare loss. This allows for the automated design of one-shot partial revelation mechanisms with worst-case guarantees on both manipulability and efficiency.