Performance of linear-space search algorithms
Artificial Intelligence
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
The Communication Complexity of Approximate Set Packing and Covering
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Integer Programming for Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible open constraint optimization
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible open constraint optimization
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue: Distributed constraint satisfaction
Exchange market for complex commodities: search for optimal matches
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
Eliciting bid taker non-price preferences in (combinatorial) auctions
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Regret-based incremental partial revelation mechanisms
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism design with partial revelation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue: Distributed constraint satisfaction
Price determination and profit sharing for bidding groups in agent-mediated auctions
PRIMA'04 Proceedings of the 7th Pacific Rim international conference on Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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Winner determination in combinatorial auctions has received significant interest in the AI Community in the last 3 years. Another difficult problem in combinatorial auctions is that of eliciting the bidders' preferences. We introduce a progressive, partial-revelation mechanism that determines an efficient allocation and the Vickrey payments. The mechanism is based on a family of algorithms that explore the natural lattice structure of the bidders' combined preferences. The mechanism elicits utilities in a natural sequence, and aims at keeping the amount of elicited information and the effort to compute the information minimal. We present analytical results on the amount of elicitation. We show that no value-querying algorithm that is constrained to querying feasible bundles can save more elicitation than one of our algorithms. We also show that one of our algorithms can determine the Vickrey payments as a costless by-product of determining an optimal allocation.