Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
On the computational power of iterative auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
An adaptive attitude bidding strategy for agents in continuous double auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Modeling negotiation in combinatorial auctions based on multi-agent
PRIMA'06 Proceedings of the 9th Pacific Rim international conference on Agent Computing and Multi-Agent Systems
Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm
Computational Economics
The Duo-Item Bisection Auction
Computational Economics
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Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among the items. However, expressing oneýs preferences can require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an approach known as incremental preference elicitation [3] and show that as the number of items increases, the amount of information required to clear the auction is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in direct revelation mechanisms. Most of the elicitors also maintain the benefit as the number of agents increases. We prove that randomization helps, in that no deterministic elicitor is a universal revelation reducer. Finally, we present a new query type that allows agents to use anytime algorithms to give approximate answers that are refined only as needed.