Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on knowledge representation
Minimizing conflicts: a heuristic repair method for constraint satisfaction and scheduling problems
Artificial Intelligence - Special volume on constraint-based reasoning
Deliberation scheduling for problem solving in time-constrained environments
Artificial Intelligence
Optimal composition of real-time systems
Artificial Intelligence
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
A Bayesian approach to relevance in game playing
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on relevance
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Monitoring and control of anytime algorithms: a dynamic programming approach
Artificial Intelligence - special issue on computational tradeoffs under bounded resources
Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Bargaining with limited computation: deliberation equilibrium
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Bidders with hard valuation problems
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Auction in dynamic environments: incorporating the cost caused by re-allocation
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Implementation with a bounded action space
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Playing games in many possible worlds
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
An Approximate Algorithm for Resource Allocation Using Combinatorial Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Management Science
Towards agents participating in realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Efficient metadeliberation auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning problems
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Evaluating the impact of inaccurate information in utility-based scheduling
Proceedings of the Conference on High Performance Computing Networking, Storage and Analysis
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
SIAM Journal on Computing
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Designing trading agents for real-world auctions
SETN'10 Proceedings of the 6th Hellenic conference on Artificial Intelligence: theories, models and applications
Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm
Computational Economics
Designing auctions for deliberative agents
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
On the Choice of Obtaining and Disclosing the Commonvalue in Auctions
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
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We investigate deliberation and bidding strategies of agents with unlimited but costly computation who are participating in auctions. The agents do not a priori know their valuations for the items begin auctioned. Instead they devote computational resources to compute their valuations. We present a normative model of bounded rationality where deliberation actions of agents are incorporated into strategies and equilibria are analyzed for standard auction protocols. We show that even in settings such as English auctions where information about other agents' valuations is revealed for free by the bidding process, agents may still compute on opponents' valuation problems, incurring a cost, in order to determine how to bid. We compare the costly computation model of bounded rationality with a different model where computation is free but limited. For some auction mechanisms the equilibrium strategies are substantially different. It can be concluded that the model of bounded rationality impacts the agents' equilibrium strategies and must be considered when designing mechanisms for computationally limited agents.