Trading Accuracy for Simplicity in Decision Trees
Machine Learning
Communication complexity
Automatic Construction of Decision Trees from Data: A Multi-Disciplinary Survey
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Sequential information elicitation in multi-agent systems
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Searching for stable mechanisms: automated design for imperfect players
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Regret-based incremental partial revelation mechanisms
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Sequential-simultaneous information elicitation in multi-agent systems
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Mechanism design for capacity allocation with price competition
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Electronic commerce
Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Partial revelation automated mechanism design
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanisms for making crowds truthful
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Analysis and optimization of multi-dimensional percentile mechanisms
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automatically designing multistage mechanisms. These can reduce elicitation burden by only querying agents for information that is relevant given their answers to previous queries. We first show how to turn a given (e.g., automatically designed using constrained optimization techniques) single-stage mechanism into the most efficient corresponding multistage mechanism given a specified elicitation tree. We then present greedy and dynamic programming (DP) algorithms that determine the elicitation tree (optimal in the DP case). Next, we show how the query savings inherent in the multistage model can be used to design the underlying single-stage mechanism to maximally take advantage of this approach. Finally, we present negative results on the design of multistage mechanisms that do not correspond to dominant-strategy single-stage mechanisms: an optimal multistage mechanism in general has to randomize over queries to hide information from the agents.