Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sequential information elicitation in multi-agent systems
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Cooperative negotiation in autonomic systems using incremental utility elicitation
UAI'03 Proceedings of the Nineteenth conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online)
ICML '06 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine learning
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
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We introduce a general setting for information elicitation in multi-agent systems, where agents may be approached both sequentially and simultaneously in order to compute a function that depends on their private secrets. We consider oblivious mechanisms for sequential-simultaneous information elicitation. In such mechanisms the ordering of agents to be approached is fixed in advance. Surprisingly, we show that these mechanisms, which are easy to represent and implement are sufficient for very general settings, such as for the classical uniform model, where agents' secret bits are uniformly distributed, and for the computation of the majority function and other classical threshold functions. Moreover, we provide efficient algorithms for the verification of the existence of the desired elicitation mechanisms, and for synthesizing such mechanisms.