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We generalize the framework of non-cooperative computation (NCC), recently introduced by Shoham and Tennenholtz, to apply to cryptographic situations. We consider functions whose inputs are held by separate, self-interested agents. We consider four components of each agent's utility function: (a) the wish to know the correct value of the function, (b) the wish to prevent others from knowing it, (c) the wish to prevent others from knowing one's own private input, and (d) the wish to know other agents' private inputs. We provide an exhaustive game theoretic analysis of all 24 possible lexicographic orderings among these four considerations, for the case of Boolean functions (mercifully, these 24 cases collapse to four). In each case we identify the class of functions for which there exists an incentive-compatible mechanism for computing the function. In this article we only consider the situation in which the inputs of different agents are probabilistically independent.