Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
K-SNCC: group deviations in subsidized non-cooperative computing
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
K-NCC: stability against group deviations in non-cooperative computation
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Rational secret sharing, revisited
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Privacy-aware mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Fairness in the presence of semi-rational parties in rational two-party secure computation
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
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We introduce the concept of non-cooperative computation (NCC), which is the joint computation of a function by self-motivated agents, where each of the agents possesses one of the inputs to the function. In NCC the agents communicate their input (truthfully or not) to a trusted center, which performs a commonly-known computation and distributes the results to the agents. The question is whether the agents can be incented to communicate their true input to the center, allowing all agents to compute the function correctly. NCC is a game theoretic concept and specifically is couched in terms of mechanism design. NCC is a very broad framework and is specialized by imposing specific structure on the agents' utility functions. The technical results we present are specific to the setting in which each agent has a primary interest in computing the function and a secondary interest in preventing the others from computing it (properties called correctness and exclusivity). For this setting we provide a complete characterization of the Boolean functions that are non-cooperatively computable. We do this for three versions of NCC: a basic deterministic version, a probabilistic version and a version in which the computation can be subsidized by the center. The analysis turns out to depend on whether the inputs of the agents are probabilistically correlated or not and we analyze both cases.