Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory

Authors:
Stephen Morris;Hyun Song Shin
Affiliations:
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A. (E-mail: smorris@econ.sas.upenn.edu);Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, U.K. (E-mail: hyun.shin@economics.ox.ac.uk)
Venue:
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Year:
1997

Citing 6
Cited 3

Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief

Artificial Intelligence
Knowledge, probability, and adversaries

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Reasoning about knowledge

Reasoning about knowledge
Handbook of Logic and Language

Handbook of Logic and Language
Three Views of Common Knowledge

Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge

Coordination in an Email Game without ``Almost Common Knowledge''

Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case

Theoretical Computer Science
Non-cooperative computation: boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity

Theoretical Computer Science - Game theory meets theoretical computer science

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.