Reasoning about knowledge: an overview
Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Coordination in an Email Game without ``Almost Common Knowledge''
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Notes on Data Base Operating Systems
Operating Systems, An Advanced Course
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In the Email Game (Amer. Econom. Rev. 79 (1989) 385) noisy information channels may prevent risky-efficient coordination, even when the game is almost common knowledge. In this paper, we show that this is the case whenever message failure probabilities are not sufficiently different. Quite intuitively, the extent of the difference is governed by the game payoffs, and in particular by the mixed Nash Equilibrium strategy of one of the two games to be played. This is because, conditionally to having observed one's type, a player's beliefs on the opponent's choices are governed by the reliability of communication channels.