Reasoning about knowledge: an overview
Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Notes on Data Base Operating Systems
Operating Systems, An Advanced Course
Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case
Theoretical Computer Science
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The paper presents a variation of the EMAIL Game, originally proposed byRubinstein (American Economic Review, 1989), in which coordination ofthe more rewarding-risky joint course of actions is shown to obtain, evenwhen the relevant game is, at most, ``mutual knowledge.'' In the exampleproposed, a mediator is introduced in such a way that two individualsare symmetrically informed, rather than asymmetrically as in Rubinstein,about the game chosen by nature. As long as the message failure probabilityis sufficiently low, with the upper bound being a function of the gamepayoffs, conditional beliefs in the opponent's actions can allow playersto choose a more rewarding-risky action. The result suggests that, forefficient coordination to obtain, the length of interactive knowledge onthe game, possibly up to ``almost common knowledge,'' does not seem to bea major conceptual issue and that emphasis should be focused instead onthe communication protocol and an appropriate relationship between thereliability of communication channels and the payoffs at stake.